-"To be fair, that's her wake in the rough North Sea. The class was not normally that
"wet", but the waters around England just bring out the best in a ship. =P
Although supposedly on joint manuvers in the 1950's, HMS Vanguard's decks stayed dry while
the Iowa classes were running wet like this. Helluva ship, they should have preserved
her. =( "-
Actually Storm, that was the USS Iowa during a shakedown doing high speed maneuvers in
Chesapeake Bay MD. Not in the North Sea. While they usually didnt get that wet, the Iowa's
(you were aboard an Iowa class so you know this as well) did kick up one hell of a rooster
tail starting around 24 knts or so and at full speed of 30+knts often times did swamp the
aft section due to its own wake given their low Freeboard. You are also correct that the
Vanguard (well many of the RN's capital ships actually) had much better sea keeping than
those of the US, given they were designed for the demographic operational areas. In the
case of the RN the turbulent North Atlantic regions. The Vanguard is by far one of my
favorite battleships of all time right next to the Iowa class and the HMS Warspite (QE class)
Also concerning a battleships speed for those of you complaining about them outrunning DDs
and crap, after the battlewagons was reactivated in the 80's, the Iowa's at full steam
COULD and DID out-run much more modern era Perry class Frigates and Spruance class
destroyers while the Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh-Burkes even struggled to keep
up. Ticos and Burkes both top out around 32-33knts but are faaaaaaaar less stable than an
Iowa or supercarrier with pitch and rolling. So unless the seas were calm as glass, the
Iowa's speed even shamed them. So for any "realism" arguments, yes those 65 year old
50,000 ton iron clad behemoths could out-run or run with the US Navy's most modern and
elite surface warships aside from a Nimitz. A Nimitz will outrun just about every large
surface warship in the US arsenal.
The fastest stop by an Iowa class was the USS Wisconsin. In a coordinated operation, she
performed what is called a "Barn Door Stop" and the Ole Wisky was the only battleship to
perform this maneuver. Meaning the helmsman turned rudder control over locally to the
steering gear room in which the rudders independently were turned in toward each other 90
degrees ( like closing doors hence Barn Door Stop acting as a water-break) and the engines
were shifted to all back full at the same time. She stopped in a distance 3/4 of ship
length. A typical crash back stop for an Iowa took about 1 mile from full speed @33knts.
The rudders could only be turned like that from local control. Otherwise the normal
control from the helm turned both rudders the same direction simultaneously. It was
determined later in drydock that it in fact had also slightly damaged the rudders doing
it. Sadly the Wisky never returned to active service beyond that dry docking. This
maneuver was documented in an article written by the XO for the Naval Institute Proceedings.
Also below here is a 1/350 scale model based on the lead structural design team's actual
plan had the Iowa's been modified to carry on into the 21st century. The remaining 5"/38
dual mounts would have been replaced by the modern auto-loading Mark-45s DPs currently
used minus two mounts(further downsizing crew requirements) another +level deck addition
between the two stacks and aft main gun director where the current T-LAM box launchers are
located allowing for the installation of a 96 cell VLS systems (one cell fore the 2nd
stack and aft mast,
the second cell aft of the stack and fore of the aft gun director), while the Harpoons would
remain as is. Thus the Iowa's would pack the punch and attack capabilities that of a Tico
CG or Burke DDG, retaining their nine 16" rifles for NGFS (naval gunfire support) which
is still unrivaled by anything the Navy currently can offer making them still the most
formidable surface combat ship afloat. This design would allowed the Iowa's to keep turret
III (to preserve historical value and firepower retention) and avoided having to cut into
the armored 2nd deck compromising effectiveness and
structural integrity.